

Andrea Scarantino
HOW EMOTIONS ABOUT FICTIONAL OBJECTS MOTIVATE
BEHAVIOR

Abstract

Walton (1978, 1990, 1997) has influentially argued that the emotions we have towards fictional people and situations do not motivate behavior, despite having phenomenological, physiological and expressive features in common with the emotions we have towards real-world people and situations. Because emotions about fictional objects have their motivation thwarted, Walton concluded that they are *quasi-emotions*. This proposal has been widely rejected, and quasi-emotions have been reconceptualized as full-fledged emotions essential for explaining our engagement with fiction. What has largely survived in the post-Walton debate is the view that emotions towards fiction lack motivational force. Critics of Walton's quasi-emotions support this view, but add that having motivational force is not essential for being an emotion. I disagree on both counts: emotions are, or essentially involve, motivations to act, and emotions about fictional objects are motivationally powerful. The difference between emotions about fictional objects and emotions about the real world is to be found at the level of *regulation*, not at the level of *motivation*. Regulation of emotions about fictional objects can lead to various outcomes, ranging from expressing our motivation directly or indirectly to inhibiting such motivation entirely, depending on the emotion and the circumstances.

1. Introduction

Walton (1978, 1990, 1997) has influentially argued that the emotions we have towards fictional people and situations do not motivate behavior, despite having phenomenological, physiological and expressive features in common with the emotions we have towards real world people and situations. Because emotions about fiction have their motivation thwarted, Walton concluded that they are *quasi-emotions*.

This proposal has been widely rejected, and quasi-emotions have been reconceptualized as full-fledged emotions essential to explaining our engagement with

fiction (Cova, Friend 2024). As it turns out, Walton's (1990) view was not that quasi-emotions are not emotions, but rather that they are non-motivational, fiction-specific emotions different in kind from garden-variety emotions like fear, anger, compassion, and so on.

What has largely survived in the post-Walton debate is the view that emotions towards fictional objects lack motivational force.¹ Most critics of Walton's quasi-emotions support this view, but add that having motivational force is not essential for being an emotion. I disagree on both counts: emotions are, or essentially involve, motivations to act, and emotions about fictional objects are motivationally powerful just as emotions about real world objects are (Scarantino 2014; 2024).

The difference between emotions about fiction and emotions about the real world is not to be found at the level of *motivation*, but at the level of *regulation*. We regulate our emotions about fiction based on our belief that their objects are fictional, whereas we regulate our emotions about the real world based on our belief that their objects are real. Regulation of emotions about fiction can lead to various outcomes, ranging from expressing our motivation towards fictional objects directly or indirectly to inhibiting it entirely, depending on the emotion and the circumstances.

The paper is structured as follows. First, I reconstruct why Walton thinks emotions about fictional objects do not motivate and consider two ways his argument for quasi-emotions can be rejected. Second, I define motivation and explain what counts as evidence for it. Third, I argue that we have strong evidence that emotions about fictional objects have motivational force, using fear as my case study. Fourth, I make the case that all emotions about fictional objects retain their motivational powers, focusing on admiration as a potential counterexample. I conclude by briefly exploring the role garden-variety emotions play in the games of make-believe we play as fiction consumers.

2. Walton on emotions about fictional objects

Works of fiction like novels, theater productions and movies seem to elicit emotions directed at characters and situations which only exist in the fiction. Examples include *fearing* a green slime hurtling towards the spectators in a horror movie, feeling *compassion* towards Anna Karenina after her suicide, feeling *anger* towards Stanley Kowalski for the rape of Blanche in *A Streetcar Named Desire*, feeling *admiration* towards Atticus Finch in *To Kill a Mockingbird* and so on.

An especially influential approach to understanding emotional responses to fiction has been formulated by Walton (1978; 1990; 1997). On his view,

¹ Although this is the view of most authors, there are exceptions (e.g. Smuts 2006, Gendler, Kovakovich 2006).

works of fiction function as *props* in an imaginative game of make-believe. A prop is a “generator of fictional truths” operating in a world of fiction according to a “principle of generation” which determines what the prop mandates the participants to imagine (Walton 1990: 38). For example, a toddler can create a game of make-believe on her own in which dolls prescribe imagining babies, an 8-year-old and his father can create a game of make-believe in which the father plays a chasing monster and the son plays a hunted victim running for his life, and so on.

Walton (1990) encourages us to think of representational works of art as props which prescribe to fiction appreciators what is to be imagined, with each fiction appreciator playing his or her own individual game of make-believe with the prop. Fiction and nonfiction part ways at this juncture – whereas works of fiction have the function of making their consumers imagine things, works of nonfiction have the function of informing their consumers about the truth of certain propositions. Propositions whose imaginings are mandated are *fictional* rather than *true*, and they collectively constitute the *fictional world*.

Imaginings can take various forms (van Leeuwen 2013), including *constructive imaginings* (e.g. imagining what will happen to Anna Karenina’s family after her suicide), *attitudinal imaginings* (e.g. imagining that Anna is about to commit suicide), and *imaginistic imaginings* e.g. (visually imagining Anna’s mangled body under the wheels of a train). And imaginings can not only be mandated by the fiction, but also simply prompted by it, as when an individual reader imagines that Anna Karenina looks exactly like his first girlfriend (Walton 1990: 225; Van Leeuwen 2021: 644)

How does this framework apply to emotions towards fictional objects? Walton (1990) draws a close analogy between cognitive and affective responses to fiction. As we imagine the truth of some fictional propositions when we use the artwork as a prop, we also imagine our affective responses to such fictional propositions. Take the novel *Anna Karenina*, which prescribes that we imagine Anna commits suicide at the end of a troubled life. The novel also prescribes that we imagine feeling compassion for her. And we play along on both counts, jointly imagining that she commits suicide and that we feel compassion for her.

This will strike many readers as gravely misconstruing their affective responses to fiction. Although we do imagine that Anna Karenina committed suicide, we seem to feel genuine compassion for her. This produces an asymmetry between standard games of make-believe and games of fiction appreciation. Whereas in ordinary circumstances a child is only imagining to be afraid when his dad chases him in monster attire and can stop imagining at any time, the reader of *Anna Karenina* does not take himself or herself to be imagining being compassionate and is not able to stop at will (Carroll 1990), in analogy to cases in which the child gets genuinely afraid upon being chased by his dad.

Walton (1990) does not question the sincerity of fiction consumers who self-ascribe garden-variety emotions towards fictional objects. But he urges us

not take these self-reports at face value, because affective states about fictional objects fail two key requirements for qualifying as garden-variety emotions: the *belief requirement* and the *motivational requirement*.

According to the *belief requirement*, to have emotion E one must believe that the formal object of E is instantiated by the target of E, where the formal object of emotion E is a description of the conditions of correctness of E (Teroni 2007). To exemplify, in order to fear X, one must believe that danger is instantiated by X, to have compassion towards X one must believe that undeserved suffering befalls X, to have anger towards X one must believe that a slight has been committed by X, and so on.

When the targets are fictional, Walton argues that we do not believe they exist, and therefore we do not believe that they instantiate the formal objects of emotions.² For example, when movie goer Charles is looking at the green slime hurtling towards him during a horror film, Walton (1990: 196) points out that Charles does not believe that there exists in the real world any slime hurtling towards him and instantiating danger. Thus, he cannot be afraid of the slime, as per belief requirement. Now, although Walton (1978) appeared committed to this line of argument, Walton (1990: 245) acknowledged that the belief requirement is not satisfied even by emotions we have towards real world characters and situations.

Consider Frances, who was attacked by a rabid dog when she was a child (Greenspan 1981). As a result of this traumatic experience, she now fears all dogs, including sweet and old Fido. However, Frances does not believe Fido is dangerous, as shown by the fact that she lets her children play with him. Walton (1990) also mentions the case of Aaron, who is afraid of flying despite believing that flying is not dangerous. What these examples show is that one can have emotion E towards a target despite not believing that such target instantiates the formal object of E.

Since Walton raised this issue, it has become commonplace in emotion theory that emotions do not need to satisfy the *belief requirement*. All that is required for an emotion E to be instantiated is that the emoter *appraises* that the formal object of E is instantiated by the target of E, and *appraising* is a broader cognitive attitude than *believing*. A great many different types of emotion-eliciting appraisals other than believing can take a stimulus as an input and produce the representation of the formal object of an emotion as an output (Moors 2022). From this it seems to follow that, although neither Charles nor Frances nor Aaron believe that they are in danger, they all appraise that they are in danger and consequently experience fear.

²The view that we do not believe in the existence of fictional objects when we consume fiction has been questioned by some authors (Hartz 1999; Suits 2006), but in this paper I follow Cova and Friend (2024) in assuming that none of the arguments for the “suspension of disbelief” is compelling.

This is where the *motivational requirement* enters the picture (Walton 1990). According to it, to have emotion E one must be motivated towards the target of E in ways that are distinctive of E. For example, to fear X one must be motivated to avoid X, to feel compassion towards X one must be motivated to reduce X's suffering, to have anger towards X one must be motivated to behave aggressively towards X, and so on. According to Walton (1990), this is where the difference between emotions about fictional and real-world objects emerges.

Whereas Frances and Aaron are motivated to avoid, respectively, dogs and flying, Charles is not motivated to avoid the green slime. As Walton puts it, "Frances exhibits deliberate behavior characteristic of fear while Charles...not only does not but has not even the slightest tendency to" (1990: 199). When Fido approaches, Frances deliberately flees. And she is keen on avoiding dogs in the first place. Similarly, "Aaron...if he does not actually decide against traveling by air, he has a strong inclination to do so, and once aboard the airplane he must fight a temptation to get off" (198). Charles, on the contrary, "does not have even an inclination to leave the theater or call the police" (198).

What Charles does show is a battery of "more or less automatic, nondeliberate reactions" (198) to the green slime. He "clutches desperately at his chair", his "adrenaline flows", his "muscles are tensed" and he manifests a "throbbing pulse...sweaty palms...knotted stomach...spontaneous shriek" (196-199). Expressive reactions, although not explicitly mentioned by Walton (1990), can be observed in Charles as well, including widened eyes, raised upper eyelids, jaw dropped open, lips stretched horizontally, and eyebrows raised and pulled together.

Walton recognizes that these bodily occurrences are "similar" to those of genuine fear. And so are the sensations Charles experiences and identifies as the "feeling of fear". Nevertheless, Charles' affective state does not motivate him, and it consequently cannot be fear, because "[f]ear emasculated by subtracting its distinctive motivational force is not fear at all" (Walton 1990: 202). The only motivational force Charles's affective state enjoys exists *within the fiction*. For Walton (1978, 1990, 1997), it is fictional that Charles is motivated to avoid the slime, just like it is fictional that Charles believes a green slime is hurtling his way. What Charles experiences is what Walton calls *quasi-fear* of the slime, a non-motivational counterpart of fear which Charles mistakenly identifies with fear on account of its bodily and phenomenological similarities with fear.

A similar diagnosis awaits any other alleged emotions we may mistakenly think we have towards fictional objects, including compassion, anger, love, sadness, admiration, or happiness. They are non-motivational counterparts of the emotions they are nominated after, i.e. quasi-emotions. As Walton rhetorically asks, "What is pity or anger which is never to be acted on? What is love that cannot be expressed to its object and is logically or metaphysically incapable of consummation?" (1990: 196).

Walton (1990) qualifies this view in two important ways. First, quasi-emotions, despite the label suggesting less than full membership in the category – e.g.

quasi-permanent things are not permanent, quasi-scientific things are not scientific – are in fact emotions: “The experience of fictionally fearing a slime or grieving for Anna Karenina may itself be counted an emotional one, although one’s emotion is not fear of a slime or grief for Anna” (255). Note that this creates an internal contradiction in Walton’s account: if quasi-emotions are emotions, there exist emotions which are non-motivational, contrary to the *motivational requirement*. But if quasi-emotions can be emotions despite not satisfying the motivational requirement, why can’t garden-variety emotions towards fictional objects also be?

Second, fiction appreciators can have genuine, garden-variety emotions in response to their consumption of fiction, provided they are not about fictional objects. For example, although Charles “does not fear the slime...the movie might induce in him fear of something else” (202). Charles may fear a heart attack because of the intense physiological sensations he is undergoing. Charles may also fear real-world slimes like the one depicted in the movie or “other exotic horrors [analogous to the] one in the movie” (202). Thus, Charles can fear lots of real-world entities connected to the fictional slime causally, by similarity, by analogy or in some other way. These are all garden-variety fears, Walton concedes, but none of them is fear about a fictional object.

The figure below summarizes Walton’s (1990) theory of emotions in response to fictional objects:




Figure 1: According to Walton’s theory, fiction appreciators can experience non-motivational quasi-emotions about fictional objects and in some cases (hence the dotted line) motivational garden-variety emotions about real world objects connected to fictional objects.

3. *Two ways to resist Walton's argument from lack of motivation*

Summing up, this is the core argument Walton advances to conclude that no garden-variety emotion E can be experienced towards a fictional object FO:³

Argument from Lack of Motivation (ALM)

1. Suppose fiction consumer A has emotion E towards fictional object FO
2. If fiction consumer A has emotion E towards fictional object FO, then her motivation towards FO must accord with emotion E
3. Fiction consumer A's motivation towards fictional object FO does not accord with emotion E

Therefore,

4. Fiction consumer A does not have emotion E towards fictional object FO, but at best quasi-emotion E, a non-motivational counterpart of E

The leading response to ALM has been to reject premise 2 and argue that emotions in response to fictional objects do not need to motivate to be emotions (see Friend 2022). This strategy is often paired with the claim that emotions can fail to motivate even when their objects belong to the real world. Tappolet (2016: 76) describes a whole class of emotions which are *essentially contemplative*, i.e. non-motivational, including admiration, joy, relief, regret, and awe. On her view, one can *admire* a mountainous landscape, or be *joyful* about having reached the summit, or feel *relief* that the climb is over, or feel *regret* that one had to give up midway, or be in *awe* of the peaks and valleys you see underneath, without being motivated in any way towards the targets of such emotions.

Emotions can become contemplative in other circumstances as well, for example when their objects belong to the past. We feel compassion towards the "the victims of the Hiroshima nuclear bombing" (Tappolet 2016: 74), but we are not motivated to help them because there are temporally beyond our reach. Matravers (1998) has similarly argued that emotions have motivational force only when we *confront* events or situations, which is something we cannot do with respect to situations which are fictional or in the past. When we encounter events and situations merely through representations, whether fictional or nonfictional, emotions do not motivate action (Matravers 1998: 69-73).

The view that emotions directed at fiction, emotions directed at the past and emotions like admiration, joy, relief, regret, and awe directed at any object lack motivational force is mistaken. I reject premise 3 (rather than premise 2) of the *Argument from Lack of Motivation* and will make the case that emotions directed

³This argument is a generalization and modification of a similar *reductio* argument by Dos Santos (2017).

at fictional objects have their motivational powers intact.⁴ What this inquiry requires is getting clear on what motivational powers are, and what counts as evidence for them. This is the task to which I now turn.

4. *The nature of motivation*

There are several strands in the psychological literature on motivation, and various controversies surrounding different points of analysis (Heckhausen, Heckhausen 2018). At the same time, there is consensus on what theories of motivation should explain: what gives direction to behavior, what initiates it and sustains it over time, what changes its course, what energizes it and what stops it. I provide a working definition of motivation which captures what I take to be three core dimensions of the concept as discussed in the psychological literature:

Definition of motivation: Being motivated to X, or having an action tendency to X, is having X as a goal or satisfaction condition (*direction*), preparing for X cognitively and physiologically (*preparation*) and doing things aimed at achieving X, if circumstances allow (*contingent striving*)

Let us break down the various elements of this definition. First, being motivated involves having a goal X, which specifies the condition which satisfies the goal-seeking process. Consider hunger understood as a motivation. What is its goal? Eating, which leads to hunger's termination. Being motivated to X can therefore be evidenced by signs that the agent has X as a goal. For example, evidence that a dog presses a lever with the goal of eating may include that the dog presses the lever *faster* in future trials after discovering it leads to eating (docility), that the dog presses the lever *less often* once the number of food items is reduced (devaluation), and that the dog *stops* pressing the lever once the connection with eating is severed (contingency degradation) (see Tolman 1932, Nagel 1977 and Moors 2022 for discussion of these three features).

Second, being motivated to X involves preparing for X, which entails mental changes like focusing attention, and bodily changes like physiological arousal. The motivation-preparation connection was emphasized by Woodworth (1918), the father of the concept of motivation in 20th century psychology, who wrote that a "motive" "facilitates [reactions which are] preparatory to the end-reaction [and which are] driven by the trend towards the consummatory reaction" (41), where the consummatory reaction is the one of direct value to the motivated organism (e.g. eating). Preparatory changes are driven by the specific goal being pursued – different goals require different preparations. Being motivated to X

⁴ Other challenges to the view that emotions are necessarily motivational are covered in Scarantino (2024).

can therefore be evidenced by signs of mental and bodily mobilization for X. For example, evidence that a dog is motivated to eat may include focused attention on food items (mental change) and salivation (bodily change).

Third, being motivated to X involves engaging in actions aimed at X-ing, if circumstances allow. Some actions are *instrumental*— actions which serve as means to X-ing — and other actions are *consummatory* — actions which constitute X-ing. A dog motivated by hunger can explore the environment in search for food (instrumental action) and it can eat food once it finds it (consummatory action). This goal striving is *contingent* on several factors, most significantly on there not being other goals Ys which take priority over X. A dog motivated by hunger will stop striving for food when confronted by a bear, because surviving takes priority over eating.

The contingency of goal striving is a central design feature of motivation, which does not work in isolation the way *behavioral reflexes* do, but in combination with an *action selection system* which takes motivation as input and, under circumstances evaluated as suitable by the selection system, produces action as an output (Scarantino 2024). I refer to this broader selection system as *regulation*, although other terms are commonly used to designate it, including executive control, practical reasoning, and decision-making.

The fact that *regulation* oversees how motivation is expressed endows it with *flexibility* — there are in principle countless ways to achieve any goal X one is motivated to achieve (plasticity, Mele 2003). Regulation can also lead to *inhibition*, which occurs when the motivation to X is suppressed and striving towards X is blocked. As Atkinson and Birch (1978: 50) put it, “tendencies to action are only half of the story of motivation. Just as often we are inhibited [by virtue of developing] negation tendencies...responsible for the suppression of positive inclinations to act”.

We are finally ready to consider the question of whether emotions about fictional objects motivate, namely whether premise 3 of Walton’s *Argument from Lack of Motivation* is true.

5. Does Charles’ fear motivate him to avoid the green slime?

Recall the punchline of Walton’s (1990) argument that Charles’ fear of the green slime is motivationally inert.⁵ Although Charles shows automatic signs of bodily arousal, he does not engage in any deliberate avoidant behaviors, which tells us that he lacks any motivation to do so. In contrast, dog-phobic Frances

⁵ I will not use the term quasi-emotion moving forward, but the reader should keep in mind that Walton (1990) refrains from referring to the affective states we experience towards fictional objects as garden-variety emotions.

and flying-phobic Aaron engage in deliberate actions to avoid, respectively, dogs and flying.

We must distinguish here two types of avoidant behaviors, associated respectively with *anticipated fear* and with *occurrent fear*. Anticipated fear of being exposed to scary fictional objects may lead Charles to avoid going to the horror movie, just like anticipated fear of dogs may lead Frances to stay away from dogs and anticipated fear of flying may lead Aaron to avoid flying. This is not the type of avoidant behavior that can tell us whether occurrent fear motivates, which is what Walton's *Argument from Lacks of Motivation* denies when fear has a fictional object as its target.

It is quite possible that Charles' occurrent fear of the slime has motivational force, and yet Charles regularly watches horror movies because the rewards of seeing them more than compensate for his fear. This is true of lots of reluctant fliers like Aaron, who experience (by Walton's own lights) motivationally powerful fear while on an airplane, but regularly fly to reach exotic vacation destinations. What we need to compare is the occurrent fear Charles, Frances and Aaron experience while presently dealing with, respectively, fictional green slimes, real dogs and real flying airplanes.

Critics of the view that emotions in response to fictional objects have motivational force draw an inference from lack of deliberate actions towards the fictional object to lack of motivation – because Charles does not leave the theatre or call the police, they infer that he is not motivated to avoid the fictional object on the screen. This a bad inference for three reasons: it neglects the connection between preparation and motivation, it neglects the role of inhibition, and it wrongly assumes that fiction consumers never show deliberate actions towards fictional objects in line with their emotions. I consider these three errors in turn.

5.1 Motivation as preparation to act towards fictional objects

As we have seen, being motivated to X can be revealed by what one prepares for doing rather than by what one deliberately does. Charles's automated reactions are patently preparatory for avoidance, as they include a throbbing pulse, tensed muscles, adrenaline release, widened eyes, raised upper eyelids – these bodily responses all point in the direction of preparation for energy-intensive bodily engagement with a looming threat.

It is notable that it is not just avoidance in general that drives preparatory reactions, but the specific type of avoidance at hand. In species as different as rats, monkeys, hamsters and humans, physiological changes are shaped by how imminent the threat is (Fanselow 1994). To simplify a complex literature, a suite A of physiological changes facilitates *orienting* towards an uncertain threat (e.g. foraging in an area where attacks happened in the past), a different suite B facilitates *freezing* upon detecting a threat (e.g. a predator appears in the distance),

and a third suite C facilitates *fight or flight* behaviors when the threat manifests itself fully (e.g. the predator attacks) (Orederu *et al.* 2024).

Preparation for motivated action also involves mental actions like attending, imagining, remembering, calculating, deciding, inferring, and thinking. Charles' fear of the green slime will involve, among others, mental actions like shifting focus on the slime and becoming more attuned to cues of danger in the environment. This attunement can be revealed by a potentiated startle reflex, which Charles is also likely to manifest (Orederu *et al.* 2024).

The preparation-motivation connection undermines a popular strategy for denying that Charles' fear motivates him. Consider Tappolet's (2016: 53) distinction between "manifestations of behavioral dispositions" like clutching at the chair in the movie theatre, which are "rapid and automatic, and [do not involve] the intervention of thought or decision", and "manifestations of motivated behavior" like leaving the theatre, which result from the avoidance goal set by fear jointly with the regulative decision to express it. Tappolet (2016) argues that Charles gives signs of automated behavioral dispositions, but no signs of motivated avoidant behavior. But if being motivated to avoid can be revealed by the mobilization of cognitive and bodily resources that facilitate avoidance, this is a distinction without a difference. To think otherwise would be like saying that a dog's salivation does not indicate any motivation to eat despite being clearly designed to facilitate eating.

5.2 Inhibited motivation towards fictional objects

The second flaw of inferring lack of motivation from lack of deliberate actions is that one can be motivated to do something and not do it because of inhibitory forces. As we have seen, motivation is designed to work jointly with regulation to shape behavior, and regulation often leads to inhibition, for example when goals incompatible with expressing one's motivation take priority.

This is the situation flying-phobic Aaron finds himself in after take-off. Fear motivates him to avoid danger, but he inhibits his motivation in order to reach his favorite vacation destination with his family. This is why his avoidant motivation does not get expressed by storming the cockpit and demanding an immediate return to the airport. Yet, we correctly interpret Aaron as suppressing his motivation, rather than not being motivated in the first place.

Why should we not conclude the same about Charles? Aaron and Charles are alike in not believing they are in danger while appraising, respectively, flying and the green slime as dangerous. Charles believes he is safe because the fictional object he fears does not so much as exist. Aaron most definitely does not think that the object he appraises as instantiating danger – a flying plane – does not exist, but he nevertheless does not believe he is in danger. Another relevant difference is that Charles, unlike Aaron, believes that he is reacting to a work of fiction, a deliberate attempt by a fiction creator to mandate certain acts of

imagination on his part. These differences may affect the degree to which each agent believes that they are safe, and whether their belief that they are safe remains fully separate from the act of imagining that they are in danger (e.g. Schellenberg 2013 has argued that belief and imagination merge in fictional contexts).

To understand what may lead Charles to inhibit the expression of his fear, we need to appreciate that Charles not only experiences fear (and possibly other negative emotions), but also a range of positive emotions which provide him with goals at odds with the goal of fear, namely avoidance. Charles may also have practical goals incompatible with the goal of fear, such not coming across as a coward to his date by leaving the theatre, but here I focus on the impact on motivation of his positive emotions.

There is a debate on why exactly we consume horror movies (see Carroll 1990; Casen 2017), and I can't settle this debate here. What I can do is to taxonomize the main types of positive emotions horror movies have been alleged to produce, which I collect into three buckets: *sensation-seeking* positive emotions, *information-seeking* positive emotions and *beauty-seeking* positive emotions.

Sensation-seeking positive emotions result from experiencing the physiological sensations associated with fear – e.g. adrenaline release, sweaty palms, knotted stomach – while believing that one is safe. *Excitement*, *enjoyment* and *relief* are examples of positive emotions which can be connected to the sensory side of experiencing fear and its eventual cessation (for relief). These kinds of positive emotions may explain the allure not only of horror movies, but also of thrill-seeking activities like bungee jumping, parachuting and roller coast riding, which produce even more intense physical sensations.

Information-seeking positive emotions result from learning things about oneself, about the world and about the work of fiction on account of experiencing fear while believing that one is safe. This may include being *interested* in exploring whether one can successfully control one's fear while dealing with dangers, engaging in *play* behavior with the fiction creator, satisfying one's morbid *curiosity* about dangers (Scrivner 2021), satisfying one's regular *curiosity* about how the movie ends, and so on.

Beauty-seeking positive emotions result from appreciating the aesthetic properties of the work of fiction, which, besides beauty, include grace, elegance, intellectual challenges, formal complexity and coherence, ability to induce emotions, ability to convey complex meanings, originality, creativity, skillfulness and so on (Scarantino 2022). Spectators may be *moved* by some deep truth about living life without fear disclosed by the movie, they may experience *awe* at how skilled the movie director is at producing fear, they may feel *admiration* at the special effects involved in making the green slime look real, and so on.

The central point is that Charles is regulating not just his fear of the green slime in isolation, but a combination of fear and several positive emotions occurring on the background of Charles' overall goal structure. Because positive

emotions are pleasant and motivate towards continued engagement with the movie, the most likely outcome of Charles' regulation of his fear is its inhibition. In other words, although Charles is motivated to avoid the green slime, he is most likely more strongly motivated to continue watching the horror movie.

This is why Charles (generally) does not leave the theatre or call the police. Walton is going to resist this interpretation because of what he takes to be a further difference between Aaron and Charles. Aaron "once aboard the airplane... must fight a temptation to get off" and "becomes nervous and upset", whereas Charles "does not have even an inclination to leave the theater or call the police" (198). In other words, Walton thinks that there are signs that Aaron is inhibiting his avoidant tendency, whereas there are no signs that Charles is doing so, so we can infer that he does not have any avoidant tendency to begin with.

To the contrary, Charles is very much tempted to avoid the slime, in the straightforward sense that his body is literally preparing him for avoiding the slime. If he does not avoid the slime despite all the clutching, sweating, fidgeting, and shrieking, it is because some form of resistance intervened during regulation, not because there was no avoidant motivation. Charles is tempted in an additional sense as well: as he regulates his fear, he needs to weigh the goal of avoiding the slime against other goals he concurrently has on account of his contemporaneous positive emotions, a regulative process which may in principle end in avoidance.

But Walton is right on one account: Aaron is likely going to be more nervous and upset than Charles. This is not because Charles is not tempted to go along his avoidant tendency, but because he experiences compensatory positive emotions which Aaron is not experiencing. It is also possible that Aaron's avoidant tendency is stronger than Charles' avoidant tendency, both because more is at stake and because Aaron may have a lower degree of belief in his own safety. Some psychological data suggest that people report subjectively less intense emotions towards fictional objects than towards real world objects, although implicit measures of emotional intensity like skin conductance do not support the view (Friend 2022). All in all, it is plausible that Aaron has a harder time controlling his fear than Charles, which may result in a higher visible degree of nervousness and upset.

5.3 Expressed motivation towards fictional objects

The third flaw of inferring lack of motivation from lack of deliberate actions is that of wrongly assuming fiction consumers never engage in deliberate actions in accordance with their emotions in response to fictional objects. Spectators of horror movies do occasionally leave the theatre, or engage in clear acts of partial avoidance, like closing their eyes, covering their ears, or turning their gaze away. Walton acknowledges this possibility in response to Lamarque's (1981) suggestion that there is behavioral evidence of Charles' fear, but considers these cases

rare and “easily explained by a fear of the depiction or of experiencing it, or merely by a prediction that one will find the experience unpleasant” (Walton 1990: 202).

These cases are indeed rare, but that is because spectators of horror movies inhibit their avoidance tendencies, not because they lack avoidance tendencies. Furthermore, these rare cases cannot be explained away as Walton (1990) proposes. Spectators may leave the movie theatre because of a “prediction” that they will have an unpleasant experience at some later time, but this is not the situation we are considering. Charles is *already* having an unpleasant experience as he confronts the green slime, so if he leaves the theatre, it is to stop an unpleasant fear experience rather than to prevent one from occurring.

This unpleasantness is part of the story of how negative emotions in response to fictional objects motivate, namely by relying on their valence. Fear is associated with the goal of avoiding danger, but it is also an unpleasant sensation, and unpleasant sensations command their own cessation, as pleasant sensations command their own sustenance (Klein 2015). When we are afraid, we aim to avoid what we fear, and at the same time to stop the unpleasant sensation of fearing it. Far from being a counterargument, this is a concession that fear of fictional objects can motivate Charles to do things aimed at eliminating fear itself, namely avoiding danger.

Walton’s (1990) additional suggestions are that spectators who leave the theatre do not do so because they are afraid of the slime, but because they are afraid “of the depiction” of the slime or “of experiencing” fear of the slime. As to the latter case, Walton (1990) remarks that someone with a heart condition may fear the experience of fear itself, because it could trigger a heart attack. But this is not the norm, as Charles generally does not fear the experience of fearing the slime.

Could Charles be afraid of the depiction of the slime then? To think so requires embracing a bizarre error theory about Charles. He says he is afraid of the green slime, and not only is he wrong about being afraid (he is only quasi-afraid), he is also wrong about what he is afraid of, which is not the slime itself but only its depiction. This is not convincing. As we would not posit that Charles is afraid of the *percept* of a lion when he sees a lion or that Charles is afraid of the *imagining* of a lion when he imagines a lion, we should not posit that Charles is afraid of the *depiction* of a lion when he faces a fictional lion. In all these cases, it is the perceived, imagined or depicted lion that Charles is afraid of.

I conclude that there is converging evidence that Charles is motivated to avoid the green slime. He shows signs of mental and physical preparation for avoiding it, signs of inhibition of the tendency and occasionally signs of direct expression of the tendency in the form of averting his gaze, closing his eyes, covering his ears, or leaving the theatre all together.

6. How other emotions in response to fictional objects motivate

The case I have made about fear can be generalized to all other emotions we can have in response to fictional objects:

Emotions in Response to Fictional Objects Motivate (ERFOM): Fiction consumer A's motivation towards fictional object FO does accord with emotion E, as evidenced by the fact that E provides fiction consumer A with a goal X, that E involves mental and bodily preparation for X and that A does things aimed at achieving X if circumstances allow, with E ranging over all emotions and FO ranging over all fictional objects

If ERFOM is true, then premise 3 of Walton's (1990) *Argument from Lack of Motivation* is false: emotions have motivational force when directed at fictional objects, and we shouldn't think of them as quasi-emotions, but rather as garden-variety emotions. The following figure summarizes my proposal about the ways in which emotions about fictional objects motivate:




Figure 2: My thesis is that fiction appreciators experience garden-variety emotions about fictional objects, and that such emotions are motivationally powerful, as evidenced by signs of preparation, inhibition, and expression of such motivation

Anyone who believes emotions motivate when their targets are real-world objects should find ERFOM immediately attractive. If emotions motivate in the non-fictional context in which they are elicited, they should continue to do so in fictional contexts. To think otherwise requires positing a motivation-short-circuiting mechanism sensitive to the distinction between reality and fictionality with respect to an emotion's *cognitive bases*, which amount to the various ways in which an emotion's object can be apprehended (Deonna, Teroni 2012). For example, to appraise a dog as dangerous, one must *perceive* the dog, or *believe* the dog is present, or *imagine* the dog or have some *other form of cognitive access* to the dog – these are all possible cognitive bases of fear of the dog.

The motivation-short-circuiting mechanism would have to do two things: (a) discriminate between regular percepts and percepts in a fiction (e.g. perceiving a dog is approaching vs. perceiving a slime is approaching), regular beliefs and beliefs in a fiction (e.g. believing my cousin died vs. believing Anna Karenina died), regular imaginings and imaginings in a fiction (e.g. imagining my wife looking like my first girlfriend vs. imagining Anna Karenina looking like my first girlfriend), etc.; (b) instantly block the emergence of motivation whenever the percept/belief/imagining/etc. that constitutes the cognitive basis of the emotion takes on a fictional object.

To the best of my knowledge, nobody has provided evidence that a motivation-short-circuiting mechanism of this sort exists for *any* of the possible cognitive bases of emotions, let alone for *all of them*. Arguments have been offered to the effect that our cognitive access to fictional contents is *sui generis*, but having *sui generis* cognitive access to a content is not the same as having motivation-short-circuiting cognitive access. The motivation-short-circuiting mechanism would also be a redundant mechanism, because agents already have another mechanism on board – regulation – which can inhibit E's motivational powers when the emotion's object is fictional. This weakens the need to prevent such motivational powers from emerging in the first place when the objects of emotions are fictional.

I expect the most resistance to ERFOM to come from those who doubt that emotions always motivate even when their objects belong to the real world. I do not have enough space left to persuade skeptics that none of the alleged counterexamples to ERFOM is persuasive. What I can do is to exemplify the structure of my counterargument by focusing on *admiration*, an emotion often singled out as a prototypically non-motivational, and so a promising candidate counterexample to ERFOM.

Suppose you read *To Kill a Mockingbird* and start feeling admiration for Atticus Finch for his courage and moral rectitude in confronting racism. Does your admiration motivate you in any way? I take the goal of admiration to be stepping back in contemplation and leaning in in exploration of the admired target (Deonna, Teroni 2012; Scarantino 2022). If so, the motivational force of

a fiction consumer's admiration for Atticus Finch would be evidenced by preparation, expression, or inhibition of the tendency to contemplate and explore.

As we tackle this question, we must consider two differences between the motivational powers of admiration and fear towards fictional objects. The first is that physiological preparation plays a more limited role in the case of admiration, because the energy demands involved in contemplating and exploring pale in comparison to those involved in avoiding threats. Preparing for admiring something can simply be a matter of focusing on the admired thing and becoming attuned to cues of its admirable features, with little to no distinctive physiological changes.

The second difference concerns regulation. In the case of fear of the green slime, there was a conflict between the goal of avoiding, and the goals of various positive emotions like excitement, awe, interest and so on. Because these positive emotions collectively motivated Charles to continue watching, the most likely outcome was that Charles would regulate his avoidance tendency by inhibiting it.

In the case of admiration, there is no obvious conflict between the goal of admiration – exploring and contemplating – and other goals of the fiction consumer. And admiration involves a pleasant sensation which demands its own continuation, so the fiction consumer is more likely to express his motivation to admire Atticus Finch than to inhibit it.

This seems true not only of admiration, but of other positive emotions about fictional objects as well, like excitement, joy, interest, or amusement. The point of consuming fiction is at least in part to experience positive emotions and to express them while the game of make-believe is being played. A telling asymmetry is that fiction consumers in the grip of fear sometimes regulate it by reminding themselves that what they are afraid of is merely fictional – “enough already with all the squirming out of fear, the green slime is not real!” But fiction consumers in the grip of admiration, excitement, joy, interest, or amusement do not generally try to suppress the expression of their emotions about fictional objects. Self-commands like “stop showing interest in Anna Karenina, there is no Anna Karenina!” or “stop expressing amusement at the banana peel skit, this event only happened in a movie!” are unheard of among fiction consumers.

Now, how can a fiction consumer express his admiring tendency towards Atticus Finch while believing Atticus Finch does not exist? In lots and lots of ways, including paying special attention to his courage and moral rectitude in the fictional world, rereading passages which display these virtues, thinking about other people with similar qualities, being inspired to emulate Atticus, remembering his words and deeds, wishing Atticus well as the story progresses, talking to others about our admiration for him, being open to the message Atticus' behavior conveys, and so on. This list is far from exhaustive, because there are countless ways in which contemplation and exploration can be expressed.

A critic of motivational theories may counter that, although admiration can involve a tendency to contemplate and explore, not every case of admiration

does (Tappolet 2023: 82). On this view, someone who admires Atticus Finch does not *have* to be inclined to do anything at all which counts as contemplating and exploring Atticus Finch's admirable features. But what would we say about a person who skips the pages in which Atticus Finch's deeds are described, is totally indifferent about what happens to Atticus in the story, has no desire to emulate Atticus, does not wish to be around people like Atticus, refuses to listen to any additional information about Atticus, and yet maintains to admire him?

One thing we may say is that they are insincere. It is common to question people's sincerity when their motivations do not line up with the emotions they claim to have. We tell people who mistreat us that they do not really love us, people who don't pay attention that they are not really interested, people who do not have any inclination to help that they do not really feel compassion, people who lack reparatory impulses that they do not really feel guilt, and so on.

Another possibility is that someone who declares admiration for Atticus Finch without any motivation to contemplate and explore is engaging in "judicial uses" of emotion language, which are revealed when emotion terms can be paraphrased away without loss of content. As Bedford (1964) pointed out, when someone says "I envy Schnabel's technique", they sometimes only mean that "Schnabel has a brilliant technique", with no actual envy being involved. It is quite possible that the person who claims to admire Atticus Finch only wants to convey a favorable attitude towards him, or more specifically the attitude of believing he is admirable, without himself admiring him.

A critic may insist that a person can really and literally admire a target without any tendency to contemplate and explore his admirable features because contemplating and exploring are not what admiration motivates. I am open to the possibility that the admiring tendency is not a matter of contemplating and exploring, in which case we should reframe our description of it. What I stand behind is the view that a person's admiration of Atticus Finch must involve some admiration-specific mental or physical tendency towards Atticus Finch not to be impugned for insincerity or judicial use.

Now, even if admiration does not work as a counterexample to ERFOM, other emotions may. After all, ERFOM states that *all* emotions about fictional objects motivate, so a solitary counterexample is sufficient to undermine it. Two responses to this strategy are possible. The first is that theories which identify emotions with motivations are not in the business of mapping the exact contours of the folk psychological notion of emotion, but rather of individuating a theoretically fruitful notion of emotion. This task may require disregarding some instances of emotion as falling outside the purview of the theory if they happen not to involve any motivation. Insofar as instances of emotions which motivate are widespread and interestingly alike from a theoretical point of view, a motivational theory can be theoretically fruitful even though it is conceptually possible for an affective state which does not motivate to be called an emotion in English (Scarantino 2012).

The second response is that exceptions to ERFOM are likely to come, if at all, from emotions which do not motivate even when directed towards real world objects. If such counterexamples were to emerge, ERFOM would have to be reformulated as a conditional thesis which states that *if* an emotion E motivates towards objects believed to be real, then it will continue to motivate even towards objects believed to be fictional. The central message of this paper would remain intact: believing that the object of one's emotions is fictional rather than real, and therefore cannot be interacted with, does not deprive the emotion of its motivational force, but only affects the way the emotion is regulated.

7. *Fictional games of make-believe and emotional carryover*

Understanding that fiction produces motivationally powerful garden-variety emotions requires us to reexamine the role they play in fiction appreciation. For Walton (1990), consuming fiction is akin to playing a game of make-believe in which the appreciator imagines things to be the case, and imagines experiencing emotions like fear, admiration, anger while only experiencing quasi-fear, quasi-admiration and quasi-anger, i.e. non-motivational counterparts of fear, admiration, and anger. This setup analogizes the consumption of fiction to the ordinary case of a child who imagines being afraid without really being afraid while playing a game of make-believe with his father who pretends to be a monster chasing him.

This analogy distorts the implicit pact at the heart of fiction appreciation. When we enter a movie theatre or read a novel, we do engage in a game of make-believe, but on the presupposition that if we play along and imagine what is prescribed within the fiction, we will be rewarded by experiencing garden-variety emotions on account of having our background concerns genuinely affected. Imagining admiring Atticus Finch or imagining fearing a slime *is* playing a game of make-believe, but it is not the type of game that fiction consumers play when they engage with compelling fiction.

To modify Walton's (1990) chase game analogy, when we consume fiction, we are like a child who plays a game of make-believe with his father while expecting him to play the monster in such a convincing manner that genuine fear ensues, even though the child believes he is safe. Under such expectation, it would be a mark of a failed game of make-believe if fear were merely imagined by the child within the confines of the fictional project. Emotions are detectors of significance, and imagining emotions is imagining that things have significance, rather than registering that they do – it is the latter emotional engagement that we seek and often achieve in fiction, not the former.

Once we realize that, contra Walton, emotions about fictional objects motivate in the real world rather than merely in the world of fiction, several phenomena become ripe for re-interpretation. Consider *emotional carryover*, i.e. “the fact

that our responses to fictional characters can spill over into real life” (Friend 2010; Cova, Friend 2024: 436). If emotions about fictional objects do not motivate towards fictional objects, then emotional carryover can only be an expression of motivational force towards real world objects. But if emotions about fictional objects motivate towards fictional objects as well, emotional carryover can become a means to the end of *expressing* our original motivation towards fictional objects in an *indirect way*.

What I have in mind here is the psychological phenomenon of *substitution*, which is “the indirect weakening of the tendency for one activity that is attributable to the consummatory force for some other activity”, with the degree of substitution depending on the amount of reduction (Atkinson, Birch 1978: 128). As an example of substitution, Atkinson and Birch propose the case of an aggressive tendency towards one’s boss, which may lead to an aggressive tendency towards a third (safer) party. When the latter tendency is expressed, substitution takes place, because aggressing the third party can provide “indirect consummation” of the tendency to aggress one’s boss.

By the same token, *emotional carryover* can provide *indirect consummation* of our motivations towards fictional objects. On this view, Charles fear of real-world monsters when he comes home after the movie is not only caused by his fear of the fictional slime, but it can also provide indirect consummation of his avoidant tendency towards the fictional slime. And when the reader of *To Kill a Mockingbird* forms a tendency to contemplate and explore real-world civil rights heroes, expressing his admiring tendency towards them can provide indirect consummation of his original admiring tendency towards Atticus Finch.

Just as we can have prudential reasons not to yell at our boss despite being inclined to do so and seek substitution and indirect satisfaction by yelling at a third party, we can have reasons of ontological distance not to express our inclinations directly towards fictional objects despite being inclined to do so and seek substitution and indirect satisfaction by engaging with their real-world counterparts. It follows that our motivations towards fictional objects can not only be inhibited (e.g. Charles continues watching the horror movie), but also expressed in two importantly different ways: directly towards fictional objects (e.g. Charles leaves the theatre), and indirectly towards their real-world counterparts (e.g. Charles locks all doors once at home).

8. Conclusion

Walton’s (1978; 1990; 1997) thesis that we only experience quasi-emotions towards fictional objects has been widely rejected, but the core assumption which grounded that thesis, namely that emotions about fictional objects lack motivational powers, has been largely accepted for now five decades. In this paper, I have made the case that this is a serious mistake, because we have plenty

of evidence that emotions about fictional objects are motivationally powerful. They involve bodily and mental preparation, they are sometimes directly and sometimes indirectly expressed towards fictional objects, and they most often lead to inhibited motivation. This entails that there is no paradox of fiction as commonly understood: we experience emotions toward fictional characters, situations, and events in just the same way that we experience emotions toward real characters, situations, and events. Neither emotions about fictional objects nor emotions about real-world objects require believing that an actual object instantiates the emotion's formal object, and both emotions about fictional objects and emotions about real world objects can motivate behavior. The ontological cleavage between reality and fiction is reflected only by differences in how we regulate our emotions, not by differences in how our emotions motivate us to behave.

References

- ATKINSON, J.W. BIRCH, D.
 — 1978, *Introduction to Motivation* (2nd ed.), New York, Van Nostrand Company.
- BEDFORD, E.
 — 1964, *Emotions*, in D.F. Gustafson (ed.), *Essays in Philosophical Psychology*, New York, Doubleday: 77-98.
- CARROLL, N.
 — 1990, *The Philosophy of Horror: or, Paradoxes of the Heart*, New York, Routledge.
- CASEN, M.
 — 2017, *Why Horror Seduces*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- COVA, F, FRIEND, S.
 — 2024, *How does fiction elicit emotion?*, in A. Scarantino (ed.), *Emotion Theory: The Routledge Comprehensive Guide*, New York, Routledge: 423-443.
- DEONNA, J., TERONI, F.
 — 2012, *The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction*, London, Routledge.
- DOS SANTOS, M.
 — 2017, *Walton's quasi-emotions do not go away*, "Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism", 75: 265-274.
- FANSELOW, M.S.
 — 1994, *Neural organization of the defensive behavior system responsible for fear*, "Psychonomic Bulletin & Review", 1, 4: 429-438.
- FRIEND, S.
 — 2010, *Getting carried away*, "Midwest Studies in Philosophy", 34: 77-105.
 — 2022, *Emotion in fiction: State of the art*, "British Journal of Aesthetics", 62, 2: 257-271.
- GENDLER, T.S. KOVAKOVICH, K.
 — 2006, *Genuine rational fictional emotions*, in M. Kieran (ed.), *Contemporary Debates in Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art*, Oxford, Blackwell: 241-253.

- GREENSPAN, P.
— 1981, *Emotions as evaluations*, “Pacific Philosophical Quarterly”, 62: 158-169.
- HARTZ, G.A.
— 1999, *How we can be moved by Anna Karenina, Green Slime, and a Red Pony*, “Philosophy”, 74: 557-578.
- HECKHAUSEN, J., HECKHAUSEN, H.
— 2018, *Motivation and Action*, New York, Springer.
- KLEIN, C.
— 2015, *What the Body Commands: The Imperative Theory of Pain*, Cambridge (MA), The MIT Press.
- LAMARQUE, P.
— 1981, *How can we fear and pity fictions?*, “British Journal of Aesthetics”, 21: 291-304.
- ORDERU, T., LENNON, V. VERVLIET, B. SCHILLER, D.
— 2024, *Fear*, in A. Scarantino (ed.) *Emotion Theory: The Routledge Comprehensive Guide*, Routledge, 152-175.
- MATRAVERS, D.
— 1998, *Art and Emotion*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- MELE, A.R.
— 2003, *Motivation and Agency*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- MOORS, A.
— 2022, *Demystifying Emotions: A Typology of Theories in Psychology and Philosophy*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- NAGEL, E.
— 1977, *Goal-directed processes in biology*, “Journal of Philosophy”, 74: 261-279.
- SCARANTINO, A.
— 2012, *How to define emotions scientifically*, “Emotion Review”, 4, 4: 358-368.
— 2014, *The motivational theory of emotions*, in D. Jacobson, J. D’Arms (eds), *Moral Psychology, and Human Agency*, New York, Cambridge University Press: 156-185.
— 2022, *Aesthetic emotions, feelings and modes of action readiness*, in J. Deonna, C. Tappolet, F. Teroni (eds), *A Tribute to Ronald de Sousa*, https://www.unige.ch/cisa/related-sites/ronald-de-sousa/assets/pdf/Scarantino_Paper.pdf.
— 2024, *Motivational theories of emotions in philosophy and affective science*, in A. Scarantino (ed.) *Emotion Theory: The Routledge Comprehensive Guide*, New York, Routledge: 429-466.
- SCHELLENBERG, S.
— 2013, *Belief and desire in imagination and immersion*, “Journal of Philosophy”, 110: 497-517.
- SCRIVNER, C.
— 2021, *The psychology of morbid curiosity: Development and initial validation of the morbid curiosity scale*, “Personality and Individual Differences”, 183: 111-139.
- SUITS, D.B.
— 2006, *Really believing in fiction*, “Pacific Philosophical Quarterly”, 87: 369-386.
- TAPPOLET, C.
— 2016, *Emotions, Values, and Agency*, Oxford, Oxford University Press.
— 2023, *Philosophy of Emotion: A Contemporary Introduction*, New York, Routledge.
- TERONI, F.
— 2007, *Emotions and formal objects*, “Dialectica”, 61: 395-415.

- TOLMAN, E.C.
— 1932, *Purposive behavior in animals and men*, New York, Appleton.
- VAN LEEUWEN, N.
— 2013, *The meanings of 'Imagine' part I: Constructive imagination*, "Philosophy Compass", 8, 3: 220-230, doi: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2012.00508.x.
— 2021, *Imagining stories: attitudes and operators*, "Philosophical Studies", 178, 2: 639-664, doi:10.1007/s11098-020-01449-4.
- WALTON, K.L.
— 1978, *Fearing fictions*, "Journal of Philosophy", 75: 5-27.
— 1990, *Mimesis as Make-Believe: On the Foundations of the Representational Arts*, Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press.
— 1997, *Spelunking, simulation, and slime: On being moved by fiction*, in M. Hjort, S. Laver (eds), *Emotion and the Arts*, New York, Oxford University Press: 37-49.
- WOODWORTH, R.S.
— 1918, *Dynamic Psychology*, New York, Columbia University Press.